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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Russia's security (strategy) delayed 
A long delayed Russian National Security Strategy, which had been in 
development since 2004 but only "was given a new impulse in June 2008" was 
presented to the Russian Security Council meeting March 24, with clear 
expectations of agreement and approval from the membership. (1)  Instead, the 
Secretary of the Security Council (and former Director of the Federal Security 
Services) Nikolai Patrushev found himself explaining to the waiting press 
assembled after the meeting that, while the "Security Council members had 
earlier agreed [on] a draft strategy, they made proposals on its improvements." 
(2)  Patrushev added that "many of these proposals were diametrically opposed" 
and an unidentified source claimed that once the Security Council session closed 
the doors to discuss the draft "nearly all the participants came out with new 
amendments." (3) 
 
Russia's current Security Concept, adopted by the Security Council in December 
1997, now viewed as outstripped by developments both within Russia and 
beyond it.  It is the product of a Russian government that was still "transitional," 
as opposed to the putatively more consolidated Putin (and Medvedev) era 
regimes.  The new Security Strategy, which was completed only the day before 
the scheduled Security Council meeting meant to approve it, (4) is the product of 
“an interdepartmental work group under the Security Council Office, which 
included representatives from several government bodies: the Government 
Office, Presidential Executive Office, Offices of the Presidential Plenipotentiary 
Envoys to the Federal Districts, the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as 
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experts and major corporations,” (5) and the timeframe it is meant to consider 
extends to the year 2020. 
 
In opening the discussion on the new Strategy at the Security Council meeting, 
Patrushev was careful to differentiate the objective of a new draft Strategy from a 
new Security Concept: “The Strategy forms a new appraisal of modern national 
and foreign threats to national security and strategic risks that have a restrictive 
influence on the stable development of our nation. For all of these reasons, it 
differs significantly from the current National Security Concept.” (6)  Therefore, 
this new Security Strategy, should it ever be approved and adopted, is primarily a 
transitional document itself. 
 
On the subject of foreign policy, the draft Strategy, according to Patrushev, sets 
as Russia's priorities "the creation of good conditions for the nation’s stable 
development and ensuring national safety. This means that in the long term, we 
will aim to build international relations on the principles of equality and mutual 
cooperation between governments, respect for the international law, providing 
real and equal security. At the same time, in order to defend its national interests, 
Russia will conduct a rational and pragmatic policy; costly confrontations and a 
new arms race are out of the question." (7) 
 
The Security Council's decision not to endorse the current draft and talk of a 
variety of "diametrically opposed" proposed additions to the draft have fueled 
speculation over the cause of yet another delay in its adoption.  Several reports 
note that both overtures from the US and an upcoming meeting with the new US 
president made a "resetting" and reworking of the international section of the 
Strategy a serious consideration. (8) 
 
It should be noted that a group of American "sages" met with the Security 
Council, President Medvedev, and Prime Minister Putin in the days leading up to 
this Security Council meeting.  One group, led by former US secretaries of state 
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Henry Kissinger and James Baker, and including another former secretary of 
state, George Schultz, as well as former Defense Secretary William Perry and 
former Senator Sam Nunn was joined by former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeni 
Primakov, former Foreign Minister and former Security Council Secretary Igor 
Ivanov, and former Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky.  These informal 
gatherings of individuals who previously held quite high level positions were 
"designed to improve Russia-US relations and produce recommendations for 
Russian and US leaders." (9) 
 
Earlier in the month, the Security Council welcomed an American delegation led 
by former senators Chuck Hagel and Gary Hart. (10)  It would seem that the 
Russian leadership is not suffering from a paucity of inputs from its American 
colleagues, officials and former US officials on the subject of the Russian-
American relationship.  With a meeting planned during the April G-20 Summit 
between US President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev 
(presumably including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin as well, at some point), there 
is certainly a sense of change in the air; clearly, this impression was strong 
enough to give Russia's security leaders pause before committing to a defined 
characterization of US-Russian relations in a new security strategy. 
 
Of course, there are other issues of contention in the Russian draft Security 
Strategy.  Several analysts have identified disparate divisions over the origins of 
Russia's strongest security challenges, as well as the interplay of domestic 
politics as holding up approval of the Strategy.  According to President of the 
National Strategy Institute Stanislav Belkovsky, the delays in adopting the 
strategy are a result of the tension between business interests and questions of 
national security.  In other words, the familiar division of the apparat between 
siloviki and “liberal” economists makes it difficult to "reconcile the[ir] interests" 
even within a national security framework. (11) 
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There are other suggestions that, rather than personal interests at play, it is 
disagreement over the identification of the main adversary that forestalls 
adoption of the Strategy.  Igor Korotchenko, a member of the Defense Ministry's 
Public Council notes, "NATO's eastward expansion – is it a real threat or 
propaganda aimed at consolidating the electorate?  Finance Minister Alexei 
Kudrin and…Patrushev would probably give different answers to that question." 
(12) 
 
However, Belkovsky emphasizes the tie-in of business interests by noting that 
"the main external threat is China," but the Russian leadership is not prepared to 
commit to this in the Strategy while its energy companies are negotiating for 
Chinese loans. (13) 
 
Whatever the cause of the new delays in adopting a National Security Strategy, 
at least two elements are illuminated by the debate.  First, the Security Council 
indeed appears to be reviving as a forum for Russia's key leaders to meet, 
discuss, and clearly even disagree over policy.  Given the Security Council's 
unique placement and design, any sign of revitalization bears watching.  It 
provides one of the few institutional arenas where Putin and Medvedev meet 
formally to discuss issues, and therefore may allow glimpses into Russia's teeter-
totter of power between president and prime minister.  The nature of the debate 
over the Security Strategy also provides an opportunity to flesh out the level of 
commitment within the Russian leadership to its current foreign policy, as well as 
to identify the rifts among those leaders, and possibly permits an opening for 
change. 
 
End note: Security Council membership 
The current iteration of the Russian Security Council is led by Secretary Nikolai 
Patrushev, although meetings often are chaired by President Medvedev.  Prime 
Minister Putin not only attends, but in the case of the March 24 meeting, was 
provided the opportunity to address an issue not on the agenda (specifically the 
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Ukraine-EU Declaration).  Before discussion opened on the draft Security 
Strategy, Putin made the following pointed remarks: "While implementing plans 
for Ukraine’s gas transit system a key factor – and for us this is also important – 
is the amount of gas pumped, and it is stated so there. This is linked to the 
possibility of loans being repaid. It is clear that this gas cannot come from 
anywhere except from the territory of the Russian Federation." (14) (Please see 
Western Regions below for an analysis of the Ukraine-EU Declaration.)  
 
According to meeting reports, the full membership of the Council is not present at 
all meetings.  Most frequently, meetings are attended by the President, Prime 
Minister, heads of "power organs" and government ministers, legislative 
representatives, as well as the heads of the presidential and governmental 
apparats. 
 
Membership of the Security Council of the Russian Federation(15) 
Dmitri Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation 
Aleksandr Bortnikov, FSB Director 
Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of the State Duma 
Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Sergei Mironov, Chairman of the Federation Council 
Sergei Naryshkin, Head of the Presidential Administration 
Rashid Nurgaliyev, Minister of Internal Affairs 
Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council 
Vladimir Putin, Chairman of the Government (Prime Minister) 
Anatoli Serdyukov, Minister of Defense 
Sergei Sobyanin, Deputy Chairman of the government and Head of the 
Government Apparat  
Mikhail Fradkov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service 
Nikolai Vinnichenko, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the Urals 
Viktor Ivanov, Director of the Federal Narcotics Service 
Anatoli Kvashnin, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to Siberia 
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Ilya Klebanov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the North-West 
Region 
Aleksandr Konovalov, Justice Minister 
Aleksei Kudrin, Finance Minister 
Nikolai Makarov, Chief of the General Staff 
Yuri Osipov, President of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
Georgi Poltavchenko, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the 
Central Federal District 
Vladimir Pronichev, First Deputy Director of the FSB and Head of the Border 
Service 
Grigori Rapota, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the Volga 
Federal District 
Oleg Safonov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the Far East 
Federal District 
Vladimir Ustinov, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President to the Southern 
Federal District 
Yuri Chaika, Procurator-General 




(1) "Security Council to approve RF national security strategy to 2020," 24 Mar 
09, 9:07 AM EST, ITAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis Academic.  This quote is 
attributed to an unidentified "Kremlin source." 
(2) "Another month given to finalize National Security Strategy," 24 Mar 09, 4:44 
PM EST, ITAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Ibid; "Russia postpones adoption of new national security strategy," 25 Mar 
09, 7:27 PM EST ITAR-TASS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) "Security Council to approve," ITAR-TASS, Ibid. 
(5) "Beginning of Meeting with Security Council On National Security Strategy of 
the Russian Federation Through to 2020 and Measures Necessary to Implement 
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It," 24 Mar 09, Kremlin website via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2009/03/24/2056_type82913_214288.shtml, 
last accessed 25 Mar 09.  Comments by SC Secretary Nikolai Patrushev. 
(6) Ibid.  
(7) Ibid.  
(8) "Russia postpones adoption...," ITAR-TASS, Ibid; "Russia will reset its 
National Security Strategy," by Vladimir Soloviev, Kommersant, No.  52, 25 Mar 
09; Excerpted by What the Papers Says (WPS) via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) "Russia and US discuss resetting of ties," 19 Mar 09, Voice of Russia via 
http://www.ruvr.ru/main.php?lng=eng&q=42252&cid=56&p=19.03.2009, last 
accessed 25 Mar 09. 
(10) "O possiysko-amerikanskom  dialoge," 11 Mar 09 Security Council of the 
Russian Federation Official Website via http://www.scrf.gov.ru/news/414.html, 
last accessed 25 Mar 09. 
(11) "Uncertain Bearings: National Security Strategy Postponed," by Rustem 
Falyakhov, RBS Daily, No. 51, 25 Mar 09; WPS via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(12) Ibid.  
(13) Ibid. 
(14) "Beginning of meeting with Security Council," 24 Mar 09, Ibid. 
(15) Sostav Soveta Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Official Website of the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation via 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/persons/sections/6/, last accessed 26 Mar 09. The 
membership is listed in order of its appearance on the Security Council Website, 
translation from Russian by ISCIP. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
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The real competition at Sochi 
The 22nd Olympic Winter Games at Sochi do not begin officially until 2014, but 
the real competition is already underway.  On April 26, the citizens of Sochi will 
choose not only their mayor for the next five years, but Sochi’s official face of the 
Olympic Games.  The winner of the upcoming election does not just open the 
festivities, but will have tremendous input during the period leading up to the 
Games, including over the construction of an entirely new $12.5 billion Olympic 
venue. With such high stakes, it is hardly surprising that the election has 
devolved into a political circus as a parade of national figures including 
politicians, major opposition figures, leaders of industry, and even a former 
Bolshoi prima ballerina, as well as the head of Sochi’s arm wrestling federation 
(1) have stepped forward in hopes of entering the race. 
 
The candidate to beat is the United Russia-backed, current acting mayor of 
Sochi, Anatolii Pakhomov, the former vice-mayor who took over last January 
after Mayor Dzhambulat Khatuov was promoted to First Vice-Governor of 
Krasnoyarsk Territory. (2) Other local contenders include Yuri Dzaganiya, of the 
local Communist Party, and Union of Right Forces co-founder Boris Nemtsov. 
 
During the 1990s, Nemtsov held posts ranging from regional governor of Nizhniy 
Novgorod, fuel and energy minister, first deputy prime minister, and State Duma 
deputy, and he continues to be a major opposition figure.  (3) He is well-known 
for his efforts to point out corruption in the current administration, which he 
alleges already has turned the local population against the Olympic building 
project.  Nemtsov currently is running on behalf of the anti-Kremlin Solidarity 
movement to “protect Sochi from the Olympic Games.” He argues that the city, 
located 900 miles south of Moscow, should be only the ceremonial home of the 
Olympics and that the actual events should take place in the north, where 
facilities already exist. (4) On Monday, he reiterated his position in an open letter 
to President Dmitri Medvedev that argued that Sochi is ill-equipped to house the 
Olympics and that the project would be more extensive, take longer, and cost 
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more than originally estimated, both financially and in environmental damage and 
displaced locals.  Nemtsov also noted that that he and others were preparing a 
“critical report” about preparations for the Games. (5) 
 
As recently as last week Nemtsov had cited as evidence a lack of local media 
coverage and the fact that he still had not received official confirmation that he 
would be allowed to run, when calling the current contest a “key election at a 
perfect time,” (6) due to its potential to illustrate to the rest of the world the level 
of existing corruption in the Russian government. On Monday, however, 
Nemtsov’s point was proven for him when two unidentified assailants doused him 
with ammonia as he exited his Sochi campaign headquarters. Unsurprisingly, the 
situation since has devolved into a one-sided war of words after Nemtsov 
accused youth activists from Kremlin-backed Nashi during an interview yesterday 
with Ekho Moskvy. Nashi and government spokespersons, on the other hand, 
have remained silent on the topic. (7) 
 
Until the ammonia-throwing incident refocused attention on Nemtsov, the newest 
candidate to enter the race, well-known oligarch Alexander Lebedev, had been 
monopolizing the spotlight. Lebedev, who is increasingly considered the face of 
the new opposition, is making a second attempt at entering Russian politics after 
a failed bid to become mayor of Moscow in 2003. (8) He is a former KGB 
operative and currently is a major Aeroflot investor, but until the March 16 
announcement Lebedev appeared to be focusing his efforts on expanding his 
media empire.  Not long after he clashed with the Kremlin in January over his 
plans to arm the reporters at Novaya gazeta, the independent Moscow-based 
newspaper that he co-owns with Mikhail Gorbachev, he also acquired London’s 
failing Evening Standard newspaper. At the time, Lebedev estimated that in order 
to keep the Evening Standard afloat, he would have to spend in excess of $43 
million over the next three years.  He recently purchased two FM licenses and 




Of course, the mayoral race in Sochi may be the perfect opportunity for Lebedev 
to expand his audience further.  Just as he often tells reporters that he is less 
interested in making money than in spending it on “good causes,” Lebedev 
already has begun his foray into politics to voice his dissatisfaction with the 
current administration and to drum up anti-Kremlin sentiment.  He is candid about 
his view that the success of the opposition in the upcoming mayoral election will 
help onlookers gauge the extent to which public support for the current 
government has waned over the past year. “We could show what an election is,” 
declared Lebedev, who subsequently offered himself as a “guinea pig” for the 
experiment. (10) Before he entered the political arena, Lebedev called the Sochi 
games “one of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s pet projects, an idiotic expenditure 
of money,” (11) but he has not expanded on his platform beyond announcing his 
plans to run as an independent.  
 
Even though Lebedev has refrained from connecting his candidacy to the 
Independent Democratic Party (IDP), which he and Gorbachev founded last 
September, his actions to this point have been in line with IDP’s stated goals, 
including legal and economic reform and the establishment of a strong, 
independent media. (12) Whether or not Lebedev is using this election as a 
means of strengthening the IDP may not actually matter, however, as election 
officials have not given official approval of his candidacy. 
 
At its heart, the mayoral election in Sochi is less about who controls the city than 
it is a signal of the future balance of power in the country. Because Putin already 
has promised the world that the 2014 games would be a “major international 
event and celebration for the whole Russian nation,” (13) he and the government 
now have to ensure that the next mayor (and subsequently, local authority over 
the project), remains under United Russia’s control. 
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Until recently, this seemed guaranteed, but events of the past year have taken a 
toll on United Russia’s popularity. In fact, the longer the economic crisis 
continues, the more likely it is that United Russia’s dominant position will erode. 
The party has lost three contests in the past month, including last week’s regional 
election in Murmansk, the Tver City Duma, and the Smolensk mayoral election, 
in which United Russia finished third. (14) The Murmansk results are particularly 
notable because the regional governor, Yuri Yevdokimov, chose to back Sergei 
Subbotin, the independent who won with 61 percent of the vote, and not United 
Russia’s candidate, leading many to wonder about the sudden loss of loyalty 
among party members. (15) 
 
Even in the wake of the three unexpected losses, there is no reason to think that 
United Russia’s hold over the Russian political scene will lessen significantly in 
the near future.  Despite the plethora of challengers, most still assume that 
Pakhomov, who is both the acting leader and the only candidate to have spent a 
significant amount of time in the city, will win on April 26.  
 
At the same time, United Russia, and the current administration, could lose even 
if they win. First, the other parties will only benefit from the national and 
international interest in this hotly contested election. Despite a probable 
Pakhomov victory, the sheer number of opposition groups involved in the election 
is evidence of a weakening of United Russia and its leadership. 
 
Second, and perhaps more essentially, if Nemtsov was correct in his prediction 
that this election will serve to show the world just how corrupt Russian 
government practices are, then efforts to win an election in their Olympic 
showcase city through coercion, intimidation, and violence might result in a public 
relations nightmare. In a Monday press conference from Sochi just hours after 
Nemtsov was attacked, Putin spoke against “politicians who use the Olympics to 




(1) Anna Malpas, “A Just Russia Joins Packed Sochi Election,” The Moscow 
Times, 20 Mar 09 via http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/375539.htm. 
Last accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(2) “Sochi starts electoral campaign of City Mayor,” The Caucasian Knot, 3 Mar 
2009 via http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/9501. Last accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(3) “Mayoral nomination of opposition leader ‘direct challenge’ to Putin – pundit,” 
Ekho Moskvy Radio, 13 Mar 09; BBC Monitoring via JRL, 14 Mar 09, 2009-#52. 
(4) Ellen Barry, “At Russian Olympic Site, Games Begin,” New York Times, 18 
Mar 2009 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/world/europe/18sochi.html?_r=1&ref=world.  
Last accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(5) Steve Gutterman, “Kremlin critic says he was doused with ammonia,” The 
Associated Press, 23 Mar 09 via 
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_RUSSIA_KREMLIN_CRITIC?SITE=M
IBAX&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT.  Last accessed 25 Mar 09. 
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8)“At Russian Olympic Site, Games Begin,” Ibid.  
(9) Steve Busfield, “’I’m about spending cash on good causes,’” The Guardian, 2 
Mar 2009 via http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/mar/01/alexander-lebedev-
evening-standard.  Last accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(10) Ibid. 
(11) “At Russian Olympic Site, Games Begin,” Ibid. 
(12) “Gorbachev, Billionaire Lebedev to Form New Party,” Radio Free Europe 
Radio Liberty, 30 Sep 2008 via 
http://www.rferl.org/Content/Gorbachev_Billionaire_Lebedev_To_Form_New_Par
ty/1292892.html.  Last accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(13) Tony Halpin, “A former spy and a murder suspect will fight to be mayor of 
$12bn Olympic city,” Times Online, 18 Mar 09 via 
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http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article5927761.ece.  Last 
accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(14) “TV looks at implications of One Russia’s local election defeat,” BBC 
Monitoring via Comtex News Network, Inc. 16 Mar 09 via 
http://www.comtex.com/news.aspx?headline=TV%20looks%20at%20implications
%20of%20One%20Russia%27s%20local%20election%20defeat&ContentID=122
056302.  Last accessed 20 Mar 09. 
(15) “At Russian Olympic Site, Games Begin,” Ibid.  
(16) “Kremlin critic says he was doused with ammonia,” Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
GRU to survive? 
In the last four months there has been considerable confusion over the  status 
and future of Russia’s military intelligence directorate, the GRU. Early in 
November, reports (strenuously denied by the Defense Ministry) emerged that 
the agency’s Chief, Valentin Korabel’nikov, had resigned in protest at planned 
military reforms. Then in February, Moskovskiy komsomolets reported that GRU 
would be stripped of its Spetsnaz and strategic intelligence capacities, leaving it 
to deal only with tactical or theater matters. Korabel’nikov would be retiring rather 
than resigning, and since he had failed to nominate a successor, his replacement 
would be drafted in from SVR, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service. This 
effectively would have signaled the demise of GRU as an independent entity. (1) 
 
On 17 March, Nezavisimaya gazeta claimed that the 67th Special Forces 
Brigade—GRU’s most decorated force—was one of the units being targeted for 
disbandment (2), while Argumenty nedeli reported that more than ten other elite 
GRU groups either would be shut down or transferred to SVR or MVD. (3) Both 
articles alleged that Korabel’nikov had written his resignation, but had not signed 
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or submitted it yet, because he still hoped to persuade his deputy to take over. 
(4) Once more, reports on GRU’s alleged fate resulted in a brusque response 
from the Defense Ministry. 
 
Two days after the aforementioned articles were published, Colonel-General 
Vasili Smirnov (Deputy Head of the General Staff), noted that rumors of an SVR 
takeover were “total nonsense,” and insisted that GRU would “continue to exist 
as a separate military intelligence body” (5) with Korabel’nikov in charge. 
Technically of retirement age, Korabel’nikov’s tenure has been extended for a 
further two years with personal approval from President Dmitri Medvedev. (6) A 
further report quoting an unnamed source in the “intelligence community” claimed 
that Korabel’nikov had “expressed his willingness” to carry out some reforms, 
and affirmed as “out of the question” the idea of GRU being subsumed by SVR. 
(7) 
 
Izvestia (8) and Pavel’ Felgenhauer (9) claim that the 67th (Berdskaya) Brigade 
will be disbanded. As such, it is possible that some kind of a deal has been 
brokered between Korabel’nikov and Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov, 
whereby GRU loses a part of its Special Forces capacity, but maintains its overall 
independence. In light of the reality of FSB encroachment on other agencies’ turf 
in the past, such a compromise agreement must be viewed as a victory. One 
question remains to be asked: were the stories of an SVR takeover deliberate 
leaks designed to provoke public and military outrage, thereby forcing the civilian 
leadership at the Defense Ministry into this arrangement? 
 
Kazakh border improvements 
Since the spring of 2005, Russia’s border guard service has carried out a 
massive program of reform and improvement. Much of the R15 billion budget 
allocated to the changes has been spent in the Caucasus district: 72 new border 
stations have been built, troops have been issued with the latest personal 
weapons, while large numbers of new infra-red and radar sensors have been 
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installed. (10) Now that issues on the Georgian border (apparently) have been 
resolved, the focus of the reform and modernization program is being switched to 
Central Asia, and specifically to Russia’s 7,500 KM border with Kazakhstan. 
 
The reason for the need to reform the Kazakh border can be found in statistics 
quoted early in March by Vyacheslav Dorokhin, First Deputy Chief of the Border 
Guards Service. Dorokhin claims that in 2008, 50% of all narcotics (140 
kilograms of cocaine, 830 kilos of “vegetation-based” drugs, and 28.2 kilos of 
“synthetic” substances) seized by law-enforcement entered the country via 
Kazakhstan. (11) If these figures are even close to being legitimate, the Kazakh 
border represents a major national security risk. 
 
On 12 March, Major-General Oleg Kortelaynen, Chief of the Border Guards’ 
Directorate for Analysis and Coordination conducted an interview with Krasnaya 
zvezda. Kortelaynen broadly repeated Dorokhin’s assertions about narcotics 
trafficking and laid out some of the changes that have been and will be made in 
the region. First, rather than one overall regional command, the Kazakh border is 
to be divided into more organic “territorial” sectors, meaning that each outpost or 
section of troops will be responsible for a smaller area, hopefully making patrols 
more efficient. Second, construction was completed on five command posts for 
these new units in 2008, and 39 more are due to be completed by the end of this 
year. Troops on the Kazakh border also will be provided with the same improved 
lodging facilities, updated weaponry and surveillance equipment as those in the 
Caucasus sectors. (12) 
 
Security against militants from the Caucasus and narco-traffickers from Central 
Asia obviously are vital matters for the Russian government. But, there is one 
glaring omission so far in the border reform plans, namely Russia’s historically 
explosive border with China.  Russia continues to sell Beijing massive quantities 
of weapons, and the potential threat emanating from that country cannot have 
 16 
escaped attention. It surely must be only a matter of time before the focus shifts 
eastward. 
 
In brief: Dzhanibekov-Focus on Russia 
Early in December, Islam Dzhanibekov, a former Chechen guerilla leader living in 
Turkey, was gunned down near his home in Istanbul. Turkish authorities initially 
did not point fingers, preferring instead to expound a number of theories for his 
assassination, including an internecine struggle. Given that the city has a 
significant exile population, this idea could not be dismissed out of hand. 
However, the fact that a standard assassination weapon (an MSP double-
barreled pistol) was found at the scene seemed to indicate that one of Russia’s 
security services was responsible for the hit. (13) 
 
As of early March, Turkey’s Intelligence Service (MIT) had taken over the 
investigation from police. The hand-over occurred because law-enforcement 
officials initially now are convinced that Russian intelligence is responsible not 
only for Dzahnibekov’s death, but for the murders of two other Chechen exiles 
(Gazi Edilsultanov and Ali Oseav), killed in September and on February 27, 
respectively. (14) Even if Turkish intelligence can prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the assassinations were ordered by Moscow, there is little that can be 
done beyond expelling intelligence personnel, stepping up counter-intelligence 
activities, and registering a diplomatic protest.  
 
Source Notes: 
(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 8 (19 Feb 09). 
(2) “Russia: Disbanding Of GRU Units Seen As Casualty of GRU-SVR Infighting. 
Unattributed Article Entitled: “The Arbat-Berdsky Anomaly: The Public, Including 
The Army, Has Not Yet Grasped The Logic Of The Military Reforms,” 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 17 Mar 09; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
 17 
(3) “Russia: Speculation Of Massive Cuts To GRU, Loss Of Presidential Access. 
Article by Aleksandr Chuykov entitled ‘Military Intelligence Loses Its Access To 
President (Lead Item), Argumenty nedeli, 17 Mar 09; OSC Translated Text via 
World News Connection.  
(4) Ibid.  
(5) “Russian General Denies Merger Plan For Military, Foreign Intelligence 
Services,” ITAR-TASS, 19 Mar 09; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(6) “Intelligence General Korabel’nikov To Stay In Office For Two More Years-
General Staff, Part 2,” Interfax, 19 Mar 09; OSC Transcribed Text via World 
News Connection. 
(7) “Reports On Russian Military Intelligence Chief’s Resignation Strongly 
Denied,” RIA Novosti, 19 Mar 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) “Russian President, Defense Minister’s Speeches, Bulava Probe, GRU Cuts 
Assessed,” Izvestia, Moscow, in Russian, 19 Mar 09; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis. 
(9) “Medvedev Publicly Supports Serdyukov,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 6 
Issue 53 via 
www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34731&tx
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Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform – some economic considerations      
The latest proposal for Russian military reform has maintained its high level of 
government rhetoric and in some cases public outcry.  Only the global economic 
crisis seemingly has captured more headlines than the “new outlook for the 
Russian army” in recent months.  Needless to say, both issues are critical to 
Russia and both are closely connected.  Military training and education decisions 
are linked with economic concerns as small schools throughout Russia are 
closing in the name of reform and consolidation.  Some procurement programs 
for newer weapon systems, crucial to Defense Minister Anatolii Serdyukov’s 
reform, also have been targeted.  In addition, manpower and fiscal constraints 
may hinder reforms.  On March 17, 2009 an extended meeting of the Defense 
Ministry was held in Moscow.  To highlight the importance of this meeting, 
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Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was in attendance (his first appearance at 
this forum).  At the meeting, General of the Army Nikolai Makarov maintained 
that last summer’s clash with Georgia was, “… a catalyst which accelerated the 
adoption of the decision [to reform].” (1)  Will the global economic crisis act as an 
inhibitor to these same reforms? 
 
Education and training 
State Secretary and Deputy Russian Defense Minister General Nikolai Pankov 
highlighted that the 64 military schools throughout Russia are strong candidates 
for cost reductions, in support of Serdyukov’s reforms. (2)  In this case, Pankov 
plans to consolidate education centers in a total of ten “backbone military 
schools” consisting of six military academies, three military and scientific centers, 
and one university.  These consolidation efforts are planned to be completed by 
2013. (3)   On the surface, there may be potential synergies with collocated 
specialists in an educational setting.  However, this advantage is being lost at the 
grassroot level with some protests having occurred at facilities targeted for 
closure. (4)  
 
Lieutenant General Viktor Goremykin, chief of the military education directorate, 
notes that the education system has to modernize and the decision to reform was 
taken “well before the onset of the economic crisis.” (5)  Part of the 
modernization implies consolidating redundant functions to support a smaller 
military force.  To illustrate, military communications schools at Kemerovo, 
Tomsk, Ryazan, and Ulyanovsk may be disbanded with their training missions 
consolidated at another facility, or these facilities may “re-role” into another 
function to support a different mission.  To complicate matters for government 
planners, Goremykin noted, some schools may remain geographically separated, 
owing to Russia’s massive size.  In some cases “structural subunits” may remain 
and fall under the control of a core facility. (6)      
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In response to a question concerning the economic impact of changing and 
consolidating the training system, Goremykin acknowledged that his directorate 
employs approximately 128,000 military and civilian employees, along with 
another 12,000 doctors of sciences and candidates of sciences. Goremykin 
admitted some of these educators “might be lost” (7)  and it is unlikely that 
educators would be the only group subject to cuts.  As institutions are 
consolidated, facility support staff (engineering, utility, ground maintenance, etc.), 
plus facility administration (clerical, planning, and leadership) logically would be 
part of this equation.  In smaller communities, this could have a significant impact 
on local economies.  
 
As to be expected, the prospect of base closures has resonated among some 
alarmists.  Gennadii Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation, called these educational reforms, “… an absolute gamble, 
destructive for the army.” (8)  Serdyukov countered that not all of the institutions 
would be completely dissolved, again bringing to mind that “structural subunits” 
might remain. (9) 
 
Along with formal military education, tactical training and field exercises are 
important to the reforms.  Like formal military education, tactical training costs 
money, time, energy, and military resources to conduct.  Ground Troops 
spokesman Colonel Igor Konashenkov commented on a recent exercise in the 
Kemerovo region, where a motorized infantry brigade conducted river crossings, 
offense and defense operations, and heavy engineering tasks.  The training 
exercise included over 5,000 troops, 400 armored vehicles/hardware, fighter and 
reconnaissance aircraft, and various types of helicopters. (10) During this 
exercise, Konashenkov remarked, “for the first time, we will study time, normative 
and other parameters of action by a motor-rifle brigade, which was set up as part 
of the Siberian District’s shift to a new shape ….” (11) 
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In addition, Defense Minister Serdyukov announced, among other things, the 
creation of a Collective Rapid Reaction Force with major exercises planned with 
Kazakhstan for September 2009 and a strategic-level exercise with the Republic 
of Belarus entitled “Zapad-2009.”  Serdyukov added, “It is envisaged to equip 
these forces with modern armaments and military equipment, specially designed 
uniforms and kits.” (12)  President Medvedev also noted that the number of 
training exercises will continue to grow and that the government will not hesitate 
to spend money on these activities. (13) 
 
Arguably, training is the lifeblood of military forces throughout the world.  While 
the aforementioned exercises appear to run the gamut from standard tactical 
tasks and joint force live-firing, to more complex combined force operations 
involving international partners, are these exercises synchronized to Serdyukov’s 
new reforms?  Perhaps, but not fully.  President Medvedev announced that the 
Security Council will meet and approve a national security strategy “in the near 
future” to guide Russian efforts through 2020.  This strategy will form the 
foundation for long-term defense plans. (14)  The potential pitfall for aggressively 
pursuing expensive training exercises is that absent a national security, how 
does the military know what to train for?  Truth be told, the majority of simple 
tactical tasks should convert easily, regardless of the grand strategy.  In contrast, 
this may not be the case with the more complex exercises.  If not planned for 
properly, the military may find itself out of step with strategy, having wasted 
precious rubles on training for inappropriate tasks.  It is clear that the Defense 
Ministry needs to monitor these training ventures, especially in a fiscally 
constrained environment.  
 
Procurement 
In addition to training, procurement and purchasing of new equipment are vital to 
implementing Serdyukov’s reforms.  Mikhail Barabanov of the Moscow Defense 
Journal noted that the recent 15 percent budget reduction across all 
departments, in conjunction with increased inflation and devaluation against the 
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dollar, have created a perfect storm.  The result is that Russian military budgets 
may be reduced to 2007 spending levels, while attempting to increase combat 
capabilities. With regards to the defense budget, certain elements, such as 
servicemen’s pay, civilian pay, housing, and logistic support are not likely to be 
touched.  This leaves procurement and reform as the likely targets to absorb the 
budget cuts with combat training as another potential victim. (15)  Along similar 
lines, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lyubov Kudelina  agrees that military 
housing and salary costs likely will be preserved, but surmises that rear services 
such as food, fuel, clothing, and lubricants may be cut. However, she wonders, “If 
we stop buying fuel and lubricants, what combat training can we talk about?” (16)  
 
Some items for procurement within the defense budget have been identified as 
receiving smaller allocations, such as the GLONASS satellite navigation system, 
which is being reduced by two billion rubles and the Russian Air Force’s fifth 
generation fighter project, which may lose 938 million rubles this year. (17)  
Deputy Defense Minister, Colonel-General Vladimir Popovkin, commented that 
the financial crisis would not affect arms procurement.  He noted that over 5 
trillion rubles has been funded already for various projects to include the 
purchase of 70 strategic missiles, 30 Iskander missiles, 300 tanks, and dozens of 
aircraft and helicopters over the next three years. (18)  Having said that, 
Popovkin acknowledges many of these purchases may include existing excess 
systems that have been stockpiled in warehouses and factories, such as fourth 
generation aircraft like Su-30MK fighters, Su-27SM fighters, and even MiG-29s 
that were not delivered to Algeria. (19)  Popovkin also admitted that money will 
continue to flow in the beleaguered “Bulava” submarine-launched ballistic missile 
project.  Despite its recent failures, this missile is continuing to undergo testing 
while being manufactured in parallel. (20)  Clearly, there are some risks for 
opening a production line for a complicated missile system that has not fully 
completed operational tests.  Thus, a race will be taking place to complete the 
testing phase and to have the missile operationally ready and delivered to the 




Manpower cuts are considered another important cornerstone of the Russian 
reforms, particularly in the savings that may be generated for the armed forces.  
While savings may be reaped by the Defense Ministry, will this reform just create 
another problem with unemployed troops in the workforce? 
 
Much like the training installations being cut, operational units also are being 
slashed, often with direct impact on the local economies.  For example, the 
Berdsk 67th Special-Purpose Separate Brigade near Novosibirsk  has been 
slated for deactivation.  While this decision has interagency ramifications, 
protesters also claim that approximately 2,000 individuals will feel the impact of 
the unit’s stand-down and have called for Serdyukov’s dismissal. Anatoliy Lokot, 
a State Duma member, noted that workers would be fired, adding: “This will lead 
to social pressure at a time when it is hard to find jobs.” (21)  In addition, the 
Russian navy announced that over 5,000 personnel will be released from its 
Pacific fleet as part of the reform measures.  It is expected that this particular 
reduction will be completed in the next three to four years. (22)  
 
As the Russian military is reducing manpower in the name of cost savings, a 
recent proposal has surfaced where immigrants from the former Soviet Republics 
may be hired on to fill positions in the Army (purportedly as a cost-saving 
measure).  The president of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, Colonel-
General Leonid Ivashov commented, “The new phase of the reform is intended to 
disarm the army that is capable of repelling external threats and turn it into some 
sort of police appendage for fighting against its own people, for guarding office 
buildings.” (23)   
 
When introduced last year, Serdyukov’s reforms already were contentious.  
Combat fighting doctrine is being changed and thousands of junior and warrant 
officer positions are being eliminated, along with 200 general officers on the 
 24 
Russian General Staff.  Facility closures and unit deactivations often are 
emotionally charged events, even in the best of times.  With the added pressure 
and uncertainty of the global economic crisis, the reform efforts, especially those 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
Russia drives a hard bargain on replacement for START 
With the expiration of the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1) 
pending on December 5 2009, US President Obama’s administration has made 
negotiating a new agreement to replace START-1 a foreign policy priority.  
However, recent comments by Russia’s foreign minister offer reason to believe 
that Moscow has not shifted its demanding position on what should be included 
in a new treaty; a position that the previous administration in Washington found 
impossible to accommodate.  Russian inflexibility could prove a serious obstacle 
to the Obama team’s arms control aspirations, unless the team becomes more 
willing than its predecessors to compromise on some key areas. 
 
On March 7, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke at a Plenary Meeting 
of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where he laid out the Russian 
position on replacement for START-1.  He quoted at length from a statement by 
Dmitri Medvedev, in which he asserted that a new agreement should be “legally 
binding,” should place limits on strategic delivery systems, such as 
intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, submarines and even cruise missiles, 
and should exclude the “possible deployment of strategic offensive arms outside 
national territory.” (1) 
 
Lavrov went on to add his own list of points that he said would need to be 
addressed to achieve a successful global arms control regime, ultimately arriving 
at the goal of a “global zero” point at which nuclear weapons would be 
eliminated.  These included preventing the weaponization of outer space, 
preventing the deployment of conventionally armed strategic delivery systems, 
and limiting the number of stored, as well as operationally deployed, nuclear 
weapons. (2)  Additionally, Lavrov noted, “real progress in nuclear disarmament 
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cannot be achieved in a situation when multilateral efforts to develop strategic 
[Anti-Ballistic Missile] systems undermine this relationship.” (3) 
 
Russia’s terms are rooted in a careful strategic calculus designed to maintain an 
effective deterrent capability against the United States.  While the US maintains 
the capacity to develop advanced, new strategic weapons systems (and to bring 
many mothballed variants out of retirement), Russia’s aging nuclear arsenal is 
not being replaced effectively with new platforms.  Despite recently becoming the 
“top priority” of Russian defense spending, nuclear modernization efforts have 
been dogged by failure in recent years. (4)  Moscow has voiced apprehension 
that a numerically superior US nuclear arsenal could render Russia vulnerable.  
Deteriorating arms stockpiles also constitute one reason given for Russian noisy 
objection to the proposed American deployment of a handful of defensive 
missiles in east-central Europe.  Thus, Russia appears eager to complement its 
strategic modernization effort with stringent treaty-based restrictions on the 
deployment of weapons by the United States. 
 
Moscow’s ambitious arms control agenda appears destined to run afoul of 
several long-term American priorities, notably the keeping of reserve stockpiles 
of non-deployed nuclear weapons and the creation of a conventionally armed, 
precision ballistic missile system called “prompt global strike.” (5)  Differences on 
these issues, as well as a desire to end limits on strategic delivery vehicles, 
undermined efforts to make progress on a new arms control agreement in the 
waning days of the Bush administration. (6) 
 
Since President Obama has taken office, talks on a treaty have yet to resume.  
However, his foreign policy team has been making preparations for such 
negotiations.  According to acting State Department spokesman Robert Wood, 
the drive to replace the START Agreement would be placed on a “fast track” to 
try to achieve results before the expiration of the present treaty on December 5th. 
(7)  At her recent meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov, Secretary of State Hillary 
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Clinton reiterated the arms control priority and explained that she and her 
Russian counterpart had developed a “work plan” to attempt to get presidential 
approval of the instructions for their respective negotiators before the April 1st G-
20 meeting in London. (8)  President Obama added ambition to speed, as he 
publicly declared his own goal for a new arms control agreement that would 
facilitate an eighty percent reduction in US and Russian operational nuclear 
arsenals to a level of 1000 warheads per country. (9)  
 
Reaching agreement on a replacement for START-1 undoubtedly will require 
compromise, given the current, mutually exclusive goals of the parties.  When a 
new round of talks does begin in earnest, it may become clear whether 
Washington has decided to forgo some of its priorities in order to expedite 
completion of a treaty. The US Administration may try to decouple the issue of its 
ABM system from the larger arms control process, as indicated by the recently 
leaked “secret letter” outlining a possible American compromise offer on the 
issue. (10)  Nonetheless, Russia’s clear interest in restricting the strategic 
capabilities of the United States appears likely to undermine Washington’s desire 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Future dim for Russia’s electricity market 
It has been said that the Kremlin mistrusts the power of the market to provide 
energy security. Today it may be said with good cause that the market has 
become the primary source of energy insecurity in Russia’s power sector. The 
wave of foreign investment that was supposed to flow to the Russian electricity 
sector following last year’s massive privatization has dried up as investors 
struggle with their own domestic issues, forcing the Russian government to 
decide whether to push ahead with the liberalization of electricity prices as 
planned, or to wait out the crisis and risk further deterioration of the nation’s 
power generation and transmission capacity. 
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Until last year, Russia’s electricity sector, the fifth largest in the world, remained 
under the exclusive control of a single state-owned company, Unified Energy 
Systems (UES). In 2008, UES produced over 960 billion kilowatt hours of 
electricity, sufficient to satisfy domestic demand and to supply power for export to 
customers in the former Soviet states, Turkey, China, and Finland. (1) For over 
twenty years, the nation’s generators churned out increasing loads of electricity 
used to power Russia’s post-Soviet economy without any major capital inputs, 
and it has been clear for nearly a decade that the sector is desperately in need of 
a dramatic overhaul to sustain the country’s economic growth. Anatolii Chubais, 
former head of UES, calculated that in order to reverse the deterioration of the 
nation’s power facilities and vast transmission grids, the sector would require 
investment of $850 billion by 2020. (2) 
 
That is a sum the Russian government was either unable or unwilling to commit 
from the government coffers, which explains why last year, in a singular 
exception to its drive for nationalization of strategic sectors, the government 
allowed UES to be dissolved and its assets sold off to foreign companies and 
investors in the power industry. (3) To attract investors, the government and UES 
drew up a plan to liberalize electricity tariffs, with industrial consumers paying 
market price starting in January, 2009, and individual households shifting to 
market rates by 2011. (4) The tariff liberalization schedule made sense at the 
time because average Russian incomes were on the rise and industrial demand 
for power was projected to grow dramatically – four to five percent through 2011. 
(5) 
 
Since the schedule was drafted, weakening markets have altered the picture 
considerably, and investors who bought into the electricity sector have been 
forced to reevaluate their commitment to inject over $183 billion into 
modernization of the sector. Giant foreign power companies like Italy’s Eni, 
Finland’s Fortum, and Germany’s E.on have all put their investment programs on 
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hold, while the United Arab Emirates’ Dubai World already has withdrawn its 
multibillion dollar bid. (6) Mikhail Slobodin, president of Integrated Energy 
Systems Holding, a company that bought into the privatization scheme, said 
recently, “We invested in a different country – growth in demand and forecast 
lack of capacity … the market model was created for growth.” (7) 
 
In early 2009, industrial consumers switched to free market prices for electricity. 
Soon thereafter, electricity use plummeted across the country – 4.8 percent in 
February coupled with a 7.7 percent decline in January, bringing Russian power 
consumption down to 2006 levels in the worst drop in industrial output on record. 
(8) With demand tumbling, free-market prices for electricity have followed, falling 
by one-third in the first three months of the year. In four regions, the free-market 
prices paid by industrial consumers actually have fallen below the state-
subsidized tariffs paid by individual households. (9) Electrical generation plants in 
the Ural mountains already are operating at a loss as the free-market price of 
power falls below production costs. Analysts are predicting that the losses will 
continue over the next three years, at least. “No one – not the Energy Ministry, 
not the regulators – can say even roughly what the next three years will hold,” 
said Vladimir Shkatov, deputy head of Market Council, a non-profit energy 
watchdog organization. (10) 
 
That uncertainty is playing havoc with the new owners of Russia’s electricity 
plants, who rely on long-term revenue projections to justify expenditures and to 
prove their viability to the bank. In spite of dark forecasts, investors are urging the 
Russian government not to abandon its price liberalization program, but to push 
ahead with plans to raise the share of consumers paying free-market prices to 50 
percent in July 2009, up from the current share of 30 percent. (11) Such a move 
could bring some measure of predictability to the power sector, but the social 
implications of introducing free-market prices in a time of falling industrial output, 
stagnating wages and rising unemployment may prove more than the 
government is willing to risk. Until the government decides, however, no 
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investment will flow to the nation’s electricity sector. Without substantial 
investment, the unmitigated decay of the sector will sap Russia’s strength 
severely when the crisis eventually subsides. 
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Russian Federation: Special Feature: Russia and Iran 
 33 
By Blake Brunner 
 
Arms, basing rights, and continuity 
In September 2008, then-US Vice President Dick Cheney exposed concern 
about Russia and Syria.  "Russian arms-dealing has endangered the prospects 
for peace and freedom in [the Middle East],” Mr. Cheney told reporters at a 
political-economic summit in Cernobbio, Italy.  He identified Russia as a primary 
source of weapons that eventually are funneled by Syria and Iran to Hizballah, 
and then continued, “This chain of aggressive moves and diplomatic reversals 
has only intensified the concern that many have about Russia's larger 
objectives.” (1) 
 
Although he was not specific, Mr. Cheney probably was referring to Syrian 
President Bashar Al-Assad’s late-August weapons-shopping trip to the Russian 
presidential residence in Sochi, where he met with Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov and President Dmitri Medvedev.  As it does with Iran, Russia maintained 
that it would sell only defensive weapons to Damascus. (2) 
 
However, for Syria, the ensuing six months have culminated in changing rhetoric 
from the new administration in Washington.  With the expressed intent of 
isolating Iran, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton earlier this month sent her acting 
assistant secretary for Near Eastern affairs, Jeffrey Feltman, and National 
Security Council official Daniel Shapiro to Damascus to hold talks with high-level 
Syrian government representatives.  For her part, Clinton spoke briefly with 
Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallam on the sidelines of a conference in Egypt 
on March 2, before meeting Lavrov in Switzerland on March 5.  Moreover, Syria’s 
major antagonists in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, are attempting to 
hew a new path, with Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal declaring a 
few weeks ago, “We have dug a deep pit and buried our differences and will not 
return to past disputes but will look forward to the future.” (3) 
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In light of the present bounty of guarded optimism from Syria’s past adversaries, 
Russia has had little to say.  It quietly maintains the patron-client relationship it 
has held with Syria, off and on, since the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation in 1980.  Although the relationship deteriorated during the 
Gorbachev era as Russia normalized relations with Israel, Russia and Syria have 
resumed cooperation steadily in the intervening years.  
 
As is the case with Iran, Russia appears to be the most important, but not the 
only, supplier of weapons to Syria; however, while Iran has purchased hundreds 
of millions of dollars worth of Russian military technology, Syria’s purchases so 
far are less extensive and apparently based on credit. (4)  Another option is for 
Syria to compensate Russia with naval basing rights.  In late January 2009, a 
flurry of reports emanated from Russian news agencies, claiming that Russia 
would set up a naval base in the Syrian port of Tartus; in subsequent days, a 
Russian naval spokesman disputed the reports, saying that they were inaccurate 
and did not represent an “official position.” (5)  Finally, a month later, the speaker 
of the Russian Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, seemed to give the extension 
of Russian bases to the Mediterranean a green light, stating that Russia must 
protect “its national interests not only along the perimeter of its borders, but … 
those parts of the world where it considers [it] important and necessary to do 
that. … The experience shows that the … ocean will remain the place where the 
interests of different states will clash. … Thus the appearance of maybe not 
bases but friendly ports.” (6) 
 
Outside the military realm, Russia has been assisting Syria with its energy 
infrastructure.  Last month, Tatneft announced the discovery of “significant” oil 
reserves in Syria’s eastern desert that should help to assuage Syria’s falling oil 
production. (7)  Additionally, several Russian energy firms—including Tatneft, 
NOVATEK and Stroitransgas—are working on developing Syria’s natural gas 
production capabilities.  On February 12, Stroitransgas announced that, over the 
next two years, it would account for more than half of the expected increase in 
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Syria’s gas output, which the company expects to rise to 24 million cubic meters 
per day.  However, considering that Syrian domestic gas need is expected to rise 
to 30 million cubic meters per day in the same time frame, these projects as yet 
do not appear to be large-scale moneymakers. (8) 
 
Given that Syria seems to be a charity case, commentators have speculated on 
the non-material benefits Russia may gain from the relationship of the two 
countries.  In the ISCIP journal Perspective (May 2008), US Army War College 
Professor Stephen Blank writes, “Russian officials apparently believe that being 
Syria’s patron demonstrates Moscow’s relevance to the Middle East as an 
indispensable great power and confirms its possession of levers that could 
advance the peace process along with Russian political, economic, and strategic 
interests in the region.”  (9) However Russia may perceive the results of its 
relationship with Syria, by avoiding overly enthusiastic rhetoric regarding 
Damascus, Russia indeed has changed the way the relationship is perceived.  
For example, senior Israeli government officials told the Jerusalem Post that they 
would prefer Russia, rather than France, to host the next Middle East peace 
conference.  "The French are trying to do everything to paint a moderate portrait 
of Assad … [and] creating an illusion of Syria, as if they are not reading the 
papers or intelligence documents," the officials said. (10) 
 
Is France attempting to replace Russia’s role as Syria’s senior partner? Barring a 
peace agreement between Syria and Israel, it is impossible to envision any 
Western nation exporting arms to Syria, but French public and private enterprises 
would be able to fulfill virtually any other role currently fulfilled by Russia.  In 
September 2008, France and Syria signed several agreements guaranteeing 




Yet, if Syria demonstrates obstructionist tendencies in the Israeli-Palestinian 
dialogue, or if Syria accelerates its cooperation with Hizballah, it is difficult to 
envision France deepening its relationship with Damascus. 
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As recently as January, Armenian officials contended that the country was 
weathering the global economic situation positively. In February, in a swift 
reversal, Yerevan altered its rhetoric and turned to the IMF for considerable 
support, as a result of which the IMF has approved a $540 million loan to 
Armenia.  Approximately $240 million of the loan is available for immediate use. 
(1) In response to the crisis, Armenia has reinstituted a floating exchange rate for 
its dram, with the intent of boosting its exports. (2) Previously, the Central Bank 
had pursued a managed floating exchange rate, in which the government 
intervened to shore up the dram. Officials say the Dram could fluctuate from a 
rate of 306 dram to 1 USD to between 360 and 380 dram to 1 USD, a decline in 
its value of up to 24 percent. (3) The World Bank approved $35 million in “fast 
track” funds to Armenia in late February to create jobs and assist in stabilizing 
the economic situation. (4) 
 
Despite its proclamations of economic stability, Armenia actually has been 
applying for help from numerous sources since January. In that month, Yerevan 
solicited a loan from Moscow, the final negotiated amount of which was $500 
million. (5) Armenia also was reported to have applied to China for a loan of $2 
billion. (6) 
 
A significant portion of Armenia’s economic troubles is a spillover effect from 
Russia’s turbulent financial situation. Remittances from Armenians working 
abroad, most notably in Russia, are a valuable source of income, amounting to 
$1.6 billion in 2008 and constituting around 20 percent of Armenia’s GDP. (7) 
While Armenian migrant workers are feeling the pinch abroad, their families are 
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facing rising unemployment at home. The number of people looking for jobs in 
Armenia increased by 4,500 in the space of a month (December 2008 to January 
2009). (8) 
 
The fragile geopolitical situation in the region has prompted subtle shifts in 
multiple capitals. In Azerbaijan, where a recent referendum made it possible for 
President Ilham Aliyev to hold office indefinitely, officials have been negotiating 
deals with Iran, particularly with regard to Baku’s energy sector. Yerevan also 
has been strengthening ties with Tehran. In December, the Armenian energy 
minister announced a joint oil pipeline project that would run from the city of 
Tabriz in Iran to Eraskh, Armenia. (9) Construction on the project should begin 
later this year. (10) That same month, representatives of the two countries signed 
cooperation agreements in several sectors, including a deal for Iranian 
investments in Armenian power lines to the tune of 75 million euros. (11) In a 
recent visit to Yerevan, Iranian Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki stressed the 
strategic nature of the Iran-Armenia relationship and discussed the planned 
project of a railroad connecting Armenia and Iran. (12) Iran also signed an 
agreement on 13 March with Russia and Azerbaijan for a joint railroad project 
that would connect Russia and Iran through Azerbaijan. (13) (The portion still 
needing to be built consists mostly of the segment connecting Iran and 
Azerbaijan.) The pursuit of these projects signifies Iran’s attempt to become an 
important regional actor and transportation hub. While the global financial crisis 
represents a disaster for many, it also poses an opportunity for some. 
 
GEORGIA 
Open for (Russian) business 
In December, Russian and Georgian representatives signed a memorandum for 
joint control of the Enguri hydro power plant, the largest in the region. The 
Russian side will be represented by Inter RAO, a state-controlled firm. (14) The 
final details for the official contract have yet to be resolved. Discussing the 
proposed deal, Saakashvili said, “We’re not going to hinder Russian companies 
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from coming to Georgia. The more business interest we get, the less political 
pressure there will be.” (15) It is possible that Georgia could not avoid Russian 
involvement at the Enguri plant, due to the facility’s location close to the Abkhaz 
border. All the same, Saakashvili should not forget where else Russia is investing 
its money (not to mention Moscow’s tendency to use state-owned companies to 
advance its regional agenda). Moscow recently signed agreements to provide 
nearly $68 million in aid to separatist Abkhazia and $80 million to South Ossetia 
(with an additional $244 million to Tskhinvali as a recovery package from the 
August fighting). (16) 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Central Asia’s water dilemma continues to make waves 
As summer draws ever closer, the Central Asian states remain locked in what 
thus far seems to be an intractable dispute over the management of the region’s 
water resources.  The Kyrgyz and Tajik governments remain steadfast in their 
intentions to build new dams and hydropower stations to meet domestic 
demands for electricity, while the Uzbek and Turkmen presidents insist that 
before construction can begin on any new hydroelectric facilities, thorough 
studies must be conducted on how they might affect the environment and 
neighboring states. (1) 
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Kyrgyzstan’s and Tajikistan’s residents continue to contend with severe power 
shortages, due to below-normal water levels in their countries’ reservoirs. 
Meanwhile, summer is drawing ever nearer, when rainfall amounts are at their 
lowest and the need for irrigation water is highest, at a time when, according to 
one hydroelectric specialist in Tashkent, average water flows in the Amu and Syr 
Daryo rivers are at only 70% of their normal levels. (2) 
 
The need for a regional agreement on sharing water resources never has been 
more urgent, and yet, perhaps driven partly out of a desperation generated by 
the knowledge that existing water resources are insufficient, the Central Asian 
leaders seem to be moving ever further away from even an attempt at 
cooperation.  In fact, at times, each government appears to be pursuing its own 
national interest above those of everyone else more doggedly than ever. 
 
Tashkent has taken refuge in the mantle of international law as embodied in the 
UN convention on using transborder water resources, to which Uzbekistan is a 
signatory.  At a recent televised roundtable held in Tashkent to discuss the 
“rational” use of water, parliament member Ziyodulla Ubaidullaev commented: 
“Based on this convention, the construction of energy facilities on transborder 
rivers should be carried out in line with international examination stipulated by 
international law. In this context, the work currently being carried out in Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan [to construct hydroelectric power stations on transborder rivers] 
should be transparent and meet international law.” [Brackets in original source.]   
His colleague, Yoqub Fattoev, stated the issue somewhat more clearly, leaving 
no ambiguity as to whose “international” interests are at stake: “We, neighbours, 
should approach this issue seriously. The water resources should be used taking 
into account the interests of the countries situated on the lower reaches of the 
[Amu Darya and Syr Darya] rivers [in the Central Asian region], specifically 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.” [Brackets in original source.] (3) 
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Abandoning its usual policy of neutrality in favor of protecting its access to 
irrigation water, the Turkmen government joined Uzbekistan’s side in the fray, 
when President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow arrived for a state visit to 
Tashkent in late February.  A summary of their discussion was released by 
Narodnoye slovo on March 3, including their discussion of water resources: “The 
presidents discussed water and energy problems in Central Asia. They noted 
that these issues should be considered on the basis of universally recognized 
norms and principles of international law taking into account the interests of all 
countries of the region and with the participation of international organizations. At 
the same time, the leaders stressed the need to prevent water flow from 
decreasing in transborder rivers and also the necessity to carry out independent 
international technical, economic and ecological examination in implementing 
energy projects on transborder rivers. The examination should be made by the 
interested sides and based on principles of openness and full awareness.” (4) 
 
Although the tone of this statement is some more muted and diplomatic than Mr. 
Fattoev’s words are, nevertheless, the message to the Kyrgyz and Tajik 
governments is quite clear: any projects involving water usage that could 
negatively affect the amount of water that reaches Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
should be subject to review by those countries’ leaderships.  The potential 
consequences for violating this principle have not been spelled out yet.  Water 
from the Amu and Syr Daryo rivers is crucial for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan’s 
agricultural sectors, thus it comes as no surprise that these two states would join 
forces in defending their interests.  Unfortunately, barring torrential downpours 
over the next few weeks, it appears that there simply is not enough water to meet 
the region’s needs, which begs the question: why do the Kyrgyz and Tajik 
governments continue to pursue the goal of increasing hydroelectric power 
generation, to the detriment of the entire region, including their own countries?  
To be sure, Central Asia’s irrigation system undoubtedly needs to be renovated 
in order to allow water to be delivered more efficiently, reducing the amount of 
water required for irrigation in the first place, but that would solve only a small 
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part of the problem.  The Central Asian states’ need for energy equals their need 
for water, and both issues must be addressed together. 
 
Kyrgyz Prime Minister Igor Chudinov appeared to recognize this when he 
addressed the Fifth World Water Forum in Istanbul last week: “…, Kyrgyzstan 
thinks that water problems must not be considered separately from the problems 
of the power generating system because compensation for the accumulation of 
irrigation water and compensation for the upkeep of hydroelectric facilities are as 
vital to the Kyrgyz and Tajik peoples as the sufficiency of irrigation water to 
Uzbek and Kazakh farm producers.” (5)  Chudinov blamed the 2008 energy and 
water crises principally on the collapse of a 1996 agreement between 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan on energy delivery, water usage and 
natural gas pipes, that was based on the system of water resource management 
adopted during the Soviet period.  One of this system’s basic tenets, which 
reportedly was incorporated into the 1996 treaty, was that Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan would provide fuel and financial compensation to Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan during the winter months, allowing these two countries to generate less 
hydropower and thereby build up sufficient water reserves to meet both the 
region’s energy and water needs in the spring and summer. (6)  New agreements 
enshrining this principle and including Turkmenistan were signed last fall, in an 
attempt to ward off new water shortages, but Tashkent shirked its part of the deal 
almost immediately, citing “technical” problems, as well as payment arrears for 
transit fees owed by Tajikistan’s state electric company. 
 
Meanwhile, both Bishkek and Dushanbe are forging ahead with their plans to 
build new dams and hydropower stations; Kyrgyzstan with the help of Russian 
investment, Tajikistan with Iranian financing.  The Tajik and Kyrgyz presidents’ 
refusals, thus far, to abandon their hydropower projects is also understandable, 
in the light of the widespread power shortages, with which both countries have 
been grappling since winter 2008.  The Tajik government has had to reduce 
electricity supplies not only to private residents and small businesses, but to its 
 44 
most important industries, not to mention being forced to shut down schools, 
hospitals, etc.  This situation clearly is untenable; however the strategies 
currently being pursued by all of the affected actors likely will exacerbate the 
crisis even further and bring them ever closer to open conflict with one another. 
 
Prime Minister Chudinov’s proposal to re-adopt the main principles of the Soviet 
water management agreement may be one place to start, but it is no longer 
enough – all of the Central Asian states, especially the two that rely most heavily 
on hydropower, must seek new, non-water based methods for generating 
electrical power, or face permanent electricity rationing. 
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Ukraine’s gas gamble 
On 23 March, Ukraine’s leaders surprised many by signing a joint declaration 
with the European Union that could provide $2.5 billion to modernize the 
country’s gas transportation network.  Although the agreement does not provide 
money specifically from either the EU or its member countries, it sends an 
important signal to the international community about Ukraine’s desire both to 
increase its gas transit reliability and to maintain complete control of its pipeline 
system. 
 
On paper, the Declaration suggests that those lobbying the EU against 
Gazprom’s planned construction of two new pipelines may have gained a 
foothold. 
 
For several years, Russia’s Gazprom has promoted two planned pipelines – the 
South Stream pipeline from Russia to Italy and Austria and the Nord Stream 
pipeline from Russia to Germany.  The South Stream line is projected to add up 
to 47 billion cubic meters per year of additional transit capacity from Russia to 
Europe, while the Nord Stream line reportedly would add 55 billion cubic meters. 
 
However, according to the EU-Ukraine Declaration, if the envisioned 
modernization of Ukraine’s transit pipelines is undertaken, that country’s pipeline 
capacity could increase by 60 billion cubic meters per year from about 2015.  (1)  
This would undermine severely the argument that both the Nord Stream and 
South Stream pipelines are necessary in order to increase capacity of gas 
flowing from Russia. 
 
This is particularly true since, on 10 March, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin placed the cost of the South Stream pipeline construction at “around 10 
billion euros,” or 12.7 billion dollars.  (2) South Stream’s original plans called for a 
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capacity of just 31 billion cubic meters per year, and it is unclear if the Kremlin’s 
recent announcement of an additional 16 billion cubic meters is included in the 
cost. 
 
Regardless, the planned capacity of South Stream (47 bcm) is well below the 
potential capacity that would be generated under the EU-supported Ukraine 
modernization plan (60 bcm) – with the Ukraine plan costing about $10 billion 
less.    Additionally, Putin has suggested that South Stream would be 
“commissioned in 2015,” whereas the accepted Ukraine-EU Master Plan for 
pipeline modernization suggests that capacity could begin to increase within 
three years.  (3) 
 
Realization of the Nord Stream pipeline is much further along in the permit and 
funding process than South Stream, with Germany backing the project 
aggressively.  Currently, Sweden and the Baltic States continue to express 
concerns about the environmental effects of laying the line under the Baltic Sea, 
but primary opposition to the line comes in large part from those concerned about 
the pipeline’s potential geopolitical effect.  The Baltics, along with Poland, have 
warned consistently against allowing Russia to isolate individual states, thereby 
creating the possibility of cutting supplies to those countries for political reasons. 
 
Mikhail Korchemkin, executive director of East European Gas Analysis, recently 
suggested that the two lines technically are not necessary to provide Europe’s 
gas.  “I strongly believe that Gazprom wants to build an excessive export 
capacity to be able to cut off supplies to any East European country without 
affecting exports to other EU countries. No other gas exporter has spare 
pipelines," he said.  (4)  These statements were made before Ukraine and the EU 
announced a potential expansion of capacity of 60 bcm per year. 
 
Given this question about necessary capacity, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
reacted quickly and sharply to the EU-Ukraine Declaration, threatening to review 
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ties with the EU.  Russia also cancelled next week’s planned talks in Moscow 
between Putin and Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko.  
 
Curiously, no Russian leader has questioned the validity of the conclusion about 
potential increased capacity.  Given that this figure was provided by Ukraine, with 
limited EU participation, it would seem that the 60 bcm figure would be a prime 
target for dispute.  However, the lack of contention over this point and the rapid 
response of Putin suggest that, in fact, there must be a significant level of 
increased capacity available in Ukraine’s existing network. 
 
It appears that Russia rather would construct additional lines bypassing Ukraine, 
thereby controlling the gas transit process completely from beginning to end.   
Using Ukraine’s potential capacity would leave Russia dependent on Ukraine for 
transiting an increasing amount of gas.  Disagreements between the two 
countries over Ukraine’s domestic gas supply have resulted in two gas 
shutdowns, which caused serious gas shortages in a number of EU countries.  
There is no guarantee, of course, that disagreements with another country 
receiving direct supplies from Russia would not result in a similar shutdown. 
 
Although the EU and Ukraine appear committed to this process, there are many 
questions that must be resolved – including funding and domestic corruption 
issues. 
 
Among other things, the declaration commits Ukraine to ensuring transparent 
operation of its gas network, setting tariffs at a rate that will “reflect actual costs 
incurred,” providing third-party access to storage facilities, and the introduction of 
EU-accepted health, safety and environmental standards.  (5) 
 
In return, the European Commission, Ukraine, and “creditors” will “cooperate in 
seeking to establish a technical co-ordinating (sic) council unit within Naftogaz of 
Ukraine.”  This council would create an EU-approved “full modernization 
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business plan” for Ukraine’s gas transportation system, and would help arrange 
the funding to undertake the system’s modernization, while overseeing actual 
work performed.   (6) 
 
The wording is typically vague and allows for the possibility that one or both sides 
will backtrack.  At the moment, Ukraine, at least, seems to understand that this 
should not be allowed to happen. 
 
The document goes farther than any other agreement between Ukraine and the 
EU regarding its gas transit system and seems to reflect a growing 
understanding that the country is facing the possibility of becoming unable to 
fulfill its transit role. Its pipes and pumping stations are old—some are decades 
old—and have received little attention.    Given that this transit role is Ukraine’s 
most important link with Europe, even the country’s fractured and feuding leaders 
agree that something must be done.  
 
Whether these leaders can continue to work together in the face of upcoming 
presidential elections (or constitutional changes eliminating the presidency) is a 
major question.  Prime Minister Tymoshenko has worked hard in recent months 
to forge a positive relationship with Russia, and these efforts have made her the 
target of attacks from President Yushchenko.  Her support for this measure could 
undermine her nascent working relationship with Putin, putting their most recent 
gas deal in danger.  It is unlikely, however, that the politically-astute Tymoshenko 
did not anticipate some Russian backlash and plan accordingly.  Regardless, the 
EU never has been unified or resolute in its relations with Russia; should Putin 
provide serious pressure it is unclear whether the EU will, in fact, move forward. 
 
The Declaration suggests that Ukraine has rejected the idea of a consortium of 
governments overseeing/profiting from their network in exchange for funding. 
This consortium idea was supported by Russia and Yushchenko. 
 
 49 
Currently, it is unclear whether the EU can or will follow through with funding for 
the project as it is now envisioned.  Although the EBRD, World Bank, and 
European Investment Bank signed the Declaration as a signal of their intent to 
locate funding, this is, in essence, a paper promise.  On Wednesday, 
Tymoshenko underscored that point during a visit to Japan, where she met with 
representatives of several Japanese financial institutions in an attempt to locate 
non-EU funding.  Given the global financial crisis, it would be an understatement 
to suggest that Tymoshenko will have a difficult job. 
 
The next six months will show much about the real feasibility of this 
modernization project.  Although it appears on paper to be to the great 
advantage of both Europe and Russia, money and politics might easily derail it.   
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